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THE KURDISH QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE 
AND THE LEGALITY OF SECESSION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
In September 2017, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq held a 
referendum asking its people if they wanted to become an independent 
state. Nearly 93 percent of voters answered yes.1 This result was 
unsurprising. The Kurds, who are spread over numerous countries, are 
commonly described as the world’s largest nation of people without a 
sovereign country to call their own.2 Their quest for independence spans 
generations, and the vast majority of Iraqi Kurds desire statehood.3 
Masrour Barzani, the son of the region’s former president and the 
chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council, said this of the 
referendum: “If you look at our history we have been mistreated 
throughout history . . . We as a nation have every right to self-
determination.”4 
Iraq declared the referendum illegal.5 In the wake of the result, it also 
quickly seized large portions of Kurdish-held territory.6 Meanwhile, the 
                                                        
1  David Zucchino, After the Vote, Does the Kurdish Dream of Independence Have a Chance?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/30/world/middleeast/kurds-iraq-
independence.html?login=email&auth=login-email. See generally Galip Dalay, After the Kurdish 
Independence Referendum, FOREIGN AFF. (Oct. 2, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2017-10-02/after-kurdish-independence-
referendum (explaining that there was a previous referendum in 2005, which also drew nearly 
unanimous support for independence; however, the 2005 referendum was led by civil society, whereas 
the 2017 referendum was formally held by the regional government, likely giving it greater 
significance and legitimacy); Marie Fantappie and Cale Salih, The Politics of the Kurdish 
Independence Referendum, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-09-19/politics-kurdish-independence-referendum 
(explaining that while Kurdish independence has been a struggle many years in the making, some Iraqi 
Kurds felt that the referendum was a calculated move by the Kurdish leaders to stay in power). 
2  Russell Goldman, Kurds Voted for Independence. Here’s Who Else Has a Say., N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/world/middleeast/kurds-independence-
referendum-explainer.html.  
3  Tim Arango, For Iraq’s Long-Suffering Kurds, Independence Beckons, N.Y. Times (Sept. 9, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/09/world/middleeast/iraq-kurdistan-kurds-kurdish-
referendum-independence.html. 
4  Id. 
5  David Zucchino and Margaret Coker, Iraq Escalates Dispute With Kurds, Threatening 
Military Action, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/world/middleeast/kurdistan-referendum-iraq.html. 
6  Sergio Peçanha, How the Kurdish Quest for Independence in Iraq Backfired, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/05/world/middleeast/kurd-
independence-iraq-turkey-iran-syria-maps-backfired.html. 
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international community provided little support for the Kurdish 
referendum, with Turkey, Iran, Syria, and even the United States 
condemning it outright.7 As of today, the Kurds’ quest for independence is 
indefinitely stalled.8 These events provide a useful paradigm for renewing 
considerations as to how secessionist movements should be viewed under 
international law. 
I. BACKGROUND: SELF-DETERMINATION AND SECESSION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Self-determination, broadly defined, is the “determination by the 
people of a territorial unit of their own future political status.”9 As a right 
of international law, it is highly codified. Article 1 of the Charter of the 
United Nations states the following: “The Purposes of the United Nations 
are . . . To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for 
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . .”10 
Meanwhile, the United Nations’ Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples states: “All peoples have 
the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.”11 The right of self-determination is also “widely accepted 
as a norm of customary international law.”12 Even more, “it is one of the 
essential principles of contemporary international law.”13 Given this, it 
                                                        
7  Id.  
8  Renaud Mansour, The Kurdish referendum backfired badly. Here's why., WASH. POST (Oct. 
25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/the-kurdish-
referendum-backfired-badly-heres-why/?utm_term=.22616b92a168. 
9  Self-Determination, MERRIAM WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/self-determination.  
10  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
11  G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960). 
12  Lawrence Eastwood, Jr., Secession: State Practice and International Law After the 
Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE L. REV. 229, 346 (1993) (“The right of self-
determination is widely accepted as a norm of customary international law. It could be easier to justify 
a secession right as an extension of the existing right of self-determination rather than attempting to 
develop the right of secession as an entirely new international law norm. States will likely show some 
reluctance to accept the extension of self-determination to include a secession right. As previously 
discussed, concerns over the possibility that a flood of secession efforts will result from the 
recognition of a secessionist right of self-determination have existed since President Wilson embraced 
the right shortly after World War. These fears have done much to ensure that no right of secession has 
ever been recognized.”). 
13  East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 91, 102 (June 30) (declaring that “The 
principle of self-determination … is one of the essential principles of contemporary international 
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might seem that the Iraqi Kurds’ right to democratically determine their 
own political status and to establish sovereignty for their stateless nation 
would be—legally speaking—an appropriate exercise of international law. 
Yet, while the right of self-determination is uncontroversial as an 
abstract moral or legal concept, there is far less clarity in the scope of its 
application. This is likely due to the limiting effect of another fundamental 
principle of international law and modern sovereignty: territorial 
integrity.14 The importance and inviolability of territorial integrity are 
enshrined in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.15 Moreover, the 
United Nations’ Friendly Relations Declaration states, “Convinced in 
consequence that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of a State or country or at its 
political independence is incompatible with the purposes and principles of 
the Charter.”16  
Control over territory is of utmost importance to states.17 Thus, it is 
unsurprising that states—like Iraq—tend to be highly resistant when a 
constituency of their population seeks independence, which implies the 
partitioning of territory. In the case of Iraq, this would mean that Iraq 
would lose control over its Kurdistan region. States’ paramount interest in 
maintaining their territory, as well as international law’s corresponding 
support for the integrity of states’ territory, therefore, provide limitations 
                                                                                                                              
law.”). This ICJ case followed allegations, among others, from Portugal that Australia had failed to 
respect the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. Id. at 92. 
14  See Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6 
ST ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 37, 38 (2010) (“[T]he principle of territorial integrity limits the right of self-
determination…”). 
15  U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
16  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 
24, 1970), at 122.  
17  Marcelo G. Kohen, SECESSION: INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (Marcelo G. 
Kohen ed., 2006) (“For States, respect of their territorial integrity is paramount. This is a consequence 
of the recognition of their equal sovereign character. One of the essential elements of the principle of 
territorial integrity is to provide a guarantee against any dismemberment of the territory. It is not only 
the respect of the territorial sovereignty, but of its integrity. This explains, for instance, why support 
for secessionist movements, or a colonial power’s decision to keep part of the territory of a colony 
after its independence, can be considered violations of the territorial integrity of the State or the people 
concerned. It is beyond doubt that this rule plays a fundamental role in international relations and, as a 
mutual obligation, it requires all States to respect each other’s territories. It is a guarantee against 
eventual external breaches, or, in other words, threats against the territorial sovereignty coming from 
abroad. But does this obligation also apply to internal secessionist movements?”). 
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upon the right of self-determination and, by implication, limit secession as 
a means of exercising the right of self-determination.18 
Practical considerations also restrict it. As President Bill Clinton once 
said, “[I]f every racial and ethnic and religious group that occupies a 
significant piece of land not occupied between others became a separate 
nation—we might have 800 countries in the world and have a very 
difficult time having a functioning economy or a functioning global polity. 
Maybe we would have 8,000—how low can you go?”19 This was echoed 
in the United Nation’s Agenda for Peace: “[I]f every ethnic, religious or 
linguistic group claimed statehood, there would be no limit to 
fragmentation, and peace, security and economic well-being for all would 
become ever more difficult to achieve.”20  
Notably, such limitations upon the scope of self-determination do not 
apply in the colonial context. International law recognizes the right of 
colonial peoples to become independent.21 The United Nations’ 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples asserts, “The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human 
rights . . . All peoples have the right to self-determination.”22 Indeed, the 
                                                        
18  Vidmar, supra note 14, at 38 (“[T]he principle of territorial integrity limits the right of self-
determination…”). 
19  Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination and Secession under International Law, 29 DENV. J. INT’ 
L. & POL’Y 305, 306 (2001) (“President Clinton's rhetoric notwithstanding, his message was that the 
right to self-determination, perhaps resulting in secession, was appropriate in Yugoslavia and 
Indonesia, both authoritarian societies, but not in a democratic Canada. A year earlier, the Supreme 
Court of Canada had responded to a Reference from the government of Canada on whether Quebec 
had the right to unilateral secession under Canadian constitutional law and international law”). 
20  Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination and Secession at 
International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 553, 567 (2010); Cf. Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and 
Secession Under International Law: The New Framework, 21 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 293 
(2015) (“Salman Rushdie, the famous novelist, wrote in ‘Shalimar the Clown’: ‘Why not just stand 
still and draw a circle round your feet and name that Selfistan?’ Any legal analysis of a group's right to 
secede from its mother state involves a determination of whether the group is randomly—and thus 
illegitimately—drawing a circle around its claimed territory and calling it a ‘Selfistan,’ or whether the 
group has a legitimate claim to a defined territory at the expense of the mother state's borders and 
territorial integrity. International law has been inadequate in addressing the legality of secessionist 
claims”). 
21  Sterio, supra note 20 (“[International law] recognizes the right of colonial peoples to self-
determination…”). 
22  G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples (Dec. 14, 1960).  
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right of colonial peoples to freely establish their own state has achieved 
jus cogens status.23  
However, given how few colonial peoples remain, this right has lost its 
utility for the large majority of modern self-determination movements.24 
Arguably, the emphasis that has been placed upon the colonial status of 
peoples, as a limited threshold requirement to justify secession, has had 
the effect of narrowing the right of self-determination and 
“disenfranchising groups that lack the requisite colonial background.”25 
For peoples that are not living under foreign subjugation—but 
nevertheless, have been or are being oppressed—cannot rely upon the 
legal rights ascribed to colonial peoples.26 
 
 
 
                                                        
23  Seshagiri, supra note 20 (“Somewhat ironically, given the paucity of remaining colonialist 
claims, the classical right of colonial self-determination has acquired jus cogens status.”). Cf. Thomas 
W. Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo, 40 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 105, 122 (2011) (“Self-determination became embedded in international law in 
1960 with the passage of the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples. According to the declaration, all peoples under colonial rule have the right to ‘freely 
determine their political status.’ This right, however, has been interpreted narrowly in its application to 
colonial peoples.”). 
24  Seshagiri, supra note 20. 
25  Id. (“In particular, self-determination has been limited at international law to apply only to 
groups that constitute ‘peoples’ and whose territorial claims fit a particular colonial mold. In this 
manner, international law provided a limited window for colonized peoples to break free from their 
colonizers though not from colonially established borders. Somewhat ironically, given the paucity of 
remaining colonialist claims, the classical right of colonial self-determination has acquired jus cogens 
status. Moreover, the fact that few colonial regimes remain in place has done little to alter the content 
of self-determination. The result is to further narrow the exercise of a right to self-determination, 
disenfranchising groups that lack the requisite colonial background. In effect, self-determination has 
been transformed from a legal right to a political rallying cry. The failure of self-determination 
doctrine to evolve reflects the international community’s deep hostility toward unilateral secession. In 
this respect both shared interests and self-interest play a role.”).  
26  See Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Iraq, MIDDLE EAST POLICY COUNCIL (2004), 
https://www.mepc.org/journal/kurds-iraq-0 (“No state on earth would support a doctrine that sanctions 
its own potential breakup. Thus, the international community has generally been hostile to any 
redrawing of the map that was not part of the decolonization process. Between Iceland’s secession 
from Denmark in 1944 and the collapse of communism in 1991, the only successful secessionist 
movements were in Singapore (1965), Bangladesh (1971) and Eritrea (1991). The collapse of 
colonialism after World War II and the recent disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 
early 1990s, led to two waves of state creation. However, there are no more empires to collapse and 
accordingly very few possibilities for further state creation today.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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II. THE ISSUE: THE TENSION BETWEEN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND THE 
RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 
This tension between territorial integrity and the purported right of self-
determination has created enormous issues. First among them is the 
difficulty of, or unwillingness to, clarify how the right of self-
determination may be reconciled with the right of territorial integrity in the 
modern, post-colonial context. This is evidenced by the fact that 
international law is silent on a non-colonial peoples’ right to secede 
through self-determination.27 
In February 2008—not unlike the Kurds in September 2017—Kosovo 
unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. This followed a bloody 
conflict in which Kosovars were ethnically cleansed and subjected to 
extensive violations of their human rights.28 Following the Republic of 
Kosovo’s declaration, the Government of Serbia filed a request before the 
United Nations, and the General Assembly posed to the International 
Court of Justice (the “ICJ”) the following question: “Is the unilateral 
declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-
Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”29 
In its advisory opinion, delivered in July 2010, the ICJ declared that 
“General international law contains no applicable prohibition of 
declarations of independence—Declaration of independence of 17 
February 2008 did not violate general international law.”30 Among other 
reasons, the ICJ supported their conclusion by looking at Security Council 
resolutions condemning similar declarations in the past. The Court 
concluded that these condemnatory resolutions were not relevant because 
they were passed in response to the unlawful use of force of the violation 
                                                        
27  Sterio, supra note 20 (“While [international law] recognizes the right of colonial peoples to 
self-determination, as well as any state’s right to the respect of its territorial integrity, international law 
is silent on the issue of whether a non-colonized minority group ever accrues the positive right to 
remedially secede from its mother state.”). 
28  Rusif Huseynov and Taavi Linnus, Remedial secession: A right to external self-
determination as a remedy to serious injustices, THE POLITICON (Nov. 1, 2017), 
http://thepoliticon.net/essays/428-remedial-secession-a-right-to-external-self-determination-as-a-
remedy-to-serious-injustices.html.  
29  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 403, at 407 (July 22) [hereinafter Kosovo Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion]. 
30  Id. at 406.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol19/iss2/4
 
 
 
 
 
 
2020]     THE KURDISH QUEST FOR INDEPENDENCE 295 
 
 
 
 
of a jus cogens norm, which differentiated the situation from that of the 
Kosovars.31 
This advisory opinion could indicate that international law is moving 
toward an expanded view of secession through self-determination in the 
non-colonial context. Indeed, it has been suggested that the Kurds could 
have possibly relied upon this precedent to legitimize their own 
referendum.32 Indeed, Visar Ymeri, the former leader of the Self-
Determination movement in Kosovo from 2015, has endorsed Kurdish 
independence.33  
It is unclear why the Kurds have not defended their referendum on the 
basis of the ICJ advisory opinion. However, even to do so would hardly 
strengthen the Kurds’ claim of secession. The advisory opinion neither 
clarifies the right of secession nor reconciles the tension between self-
determination and territorial integrity. Instead, the opinion was 
intentionally narrow, even explicitly refusing to address such issues. As 
the opinion stated further, “Issues relating to the extent of the right of self-
determination and the existence of any right of ‘remedial secession’ are 
beyond the scope of the question posed by the General Assembly.”34 So 
                                                        
31  Id. at 437 (“Several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council 
condemning particular declarations of independence … The Court notes, however, that in all of those 
instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at 
the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations 
of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from 
the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other 
egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory 
character (jus cogens). In the context of Kosovo, the Security Council has never taken this position.”).  
32  Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and Secession Under International Law: The Cases of 
Kurdistan and Catalonia, ASIL (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/1/self-
determination-and-secession-under-international-law-cases-kurdistan (“Kurds suffered years of 
oppression under the Saddam Hussein regime, when they had no meaningful rights to internal self-
determination. Fourteen states submitted briefs to the International Court of Justice in its Advisory 
Opinion on Kosovo to argue in favor of Kosovar secession and independence, based on the argument 
that international law embraced a principle of remedial secession/external self-determination in 
instances of severe oppression by the mother state. While the Kurds could have relied on the Kosovo 
precedent during the Saddam regime, this type of external self-determination-through-remedial-
secession argument is difficult to make today. Iraq is no longer ruled by Saddam Hussein, and the 
current Iraqi leadership has appeared willing to grant Kurdistan some form of autonomy.”). 
33  Nadia Riva, Nobody has the right to deny the Kurds independence: Leader of Kosovo party, 
KURDISTAN 24 (Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/b717e28e-4bb4-4a39-8cac-
f4da40b68946 (“‘The Kurdish people have suffered for a long time. They are the biggest nation 
without a state yet,’ Ymeri noted, a point which has been stressed by proponents of Kurdish 
independence. ‘Nobody has the right to deny the Kurdish people their will of being free and living in 
freedom and peace in solidarity with the other peoples of the world.’”). 
34  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion, at 405-06.  
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while the Court concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence was 
not prohibited by general international law, it remains unclear what that 
means for a right of secession through self-determination. The right to 
declare is different from the right to actually secede. To date, the Republic 
of Kosovo’s status as a legitimate state is incomplete, with only 111 
member states of the United Nations recognizing Kosovo’s status as an 
independent sovereign.35 
The persistent ambiguity of the legality of secession, partially resulting 
from the ICJ’s decision to not address it in the Kosovo case, creates a gap 
in the international legal system that is dangerous. Peoples who may be 
subjected to great oppression, violence, and persecution from their 
sovereign governments lack the legal norms and framework by which to 
establish a new state that would be free from such oppression. Judge 
Bruno Simma of the ICJ—in his separate opinion—said as much, voicing 
his frustration with the majority’s decision to not resolve this issue, and 
writing that the opinion was “unnecessarily limited and potentially 
misguiding.”36  
As he further wrote, “The Court could have addressed [arguments on 
remedial secession] on their merits; instead, its restrictive understanding of 
the scope of the question forecloses consideration of these arguments 
altogether. The relevance of self-determination and/or remedial secession 
remains an important question in terms of resolving the broader dispute in 
Kosovo and in comprehensively addressing all aspects of the accordance 
with international law of the declaration of independence.”37 Because of 
this uncertainty surrounding the legal right of secession as an expression 
                                                        
35  Countries That Recognize Kosovo, WORLD ATLAS (May 28, 2018), 
https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/which-countries-recognize-kosovo-as-a-country.html.  
36  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion (separate declaration by 
Simma, J.) (“The Court’s interpretation of the General Assembly’s request is unnecessarily limited and 
potentially misguiding. The Court’s approach reflects an outdated view of international law. The 
request deserves a more comprehensive answer, assessing both permissive and prohibitive rules of 
international law. Yet, the Court’s embrace of ‘Lotus’ entails that everything which is not expressly 
prohibited carries with it the same colour of legality. The Court could have explored whether 
international law can be deliberately neutral or silent on a certain issue, and whether it allows for the 
concept of toleration By so limiting itself, the Court has reduced the advisory quality of the Opinion.”). 
See generally Samuel Ethan Meller, The Kosovo Case: An Argument for a Remedial Declaration of 
Independence,  40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 833, 860 (2011) (“Since the ICJ requires state cooperation 
to conduct its affairs, it has an interest in saying as little as possible so as not to overreach. Therefore, 
when it is presented with an issue involving a novel issue of international law, unclear sovereignty 
over territory, and conflicting state action, it would be more important, not less, to issue a narrow 
opinion.”). 
37  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion, supra note 34. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol19/iss2/4
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of self-determination, peoples seeking independence cannot rely on it to 
legitimatize their secession. 
In the case of the Kurds in Iraq, where the powerful states are against 
the referendum and where Iraq is against Kurdish independence, the Kurds 
likely cannot establish their own state: the referendum is stillborn because 
it is not in the geopolitical interests of the relevant powers.38 That practical 
reality, however, does not mean the Kurds do not deserve to be 
independent. Nor does it mean there should not be a legal framework, or 
the pervasion of new norms, to assist peoples like the Kurds in such a 
pursuit. At the moment, the Kurds have limited recourse under 
international law. This is problematic for a people who have long suffered 
oppression, and even genocide, at the hands of their Iraqi sovereigns.39 
Just as problematic is what it means for other peoples around the world 
who are currently being violently and systematically persecuted—or, 
perhaps, may be in the future. 
III. APPROACH: THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION MUST INCLUDE 
REMEDIAL SECESSIION 
Because groups of people should have the means to separate 
themselves from oppressive regimes regardless of geopolitical interests of 
the relevant powers, international law should include the right of remedial 
secession. Remedial secession is the notion that peoples being violently 
oppressed should, as a last resort, be entitled to secede as a lawful 
expression of self-determination.40 So, while the Catalonians of Spain—
who have not been violently persecuted—would not be entitled to secede 
under international law, other peoples who are being oppressed would be. 
The emphasis that the secession must be remedial carries with it a practical 
rationale: if all peoples were automatically entitled to their own territory, it 
could create numerous conflicts and undermine the international order.41  
                                                        
38  See Gunter, supra note 26 (“With the possible exception of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish 
statehood is unlikely in the near future for several reasons. In the first place, Kurdistan (the land of the 
Kurds) is completely contained within already existing states—Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. To create 
an independent Kurdistan would threaten the territorial integrity of these preexisting states. No state on 
earth would support a doctrine that sanctions its own potential breakup. Thus, the international 
community has generally been hostile to any redrawing of the map that was not part of the 
decolonization process.”). 
39  See infra notes 67-83.  
40  Vidmar, supra note 14, at 37. 
41  Eastwood, supra note 12, at 348 (“The large number of ethnic and minority groups in the 
world . . . prevent secession from serving as a means for easing ethnic conflicts through a redrawing of 
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Secession that is remedial still involves the partitioning of territory and 
the risk of destabilization, but because it is reserved only for oppressed 
peoples, the number of peoples entitled to secede is far fewer. Thus, the 
effect upon the broader international order is smaller, as is the likelihood 
of a domino effect whereby any people anywhere could claim a country 
for their own.42 
Legal support for remedial secession draws from numerous areas. 
Some argue that justification for it can be found in the ‘safeguard clause’ 
of the United Nations’ Friendly Relations Declaration.43 The clause states: 
“The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free 
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into 
any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes 
of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.”44 The 
argument is that a right of remedial secession can be inferred from this 
clause, and as this declaration reflects customary international law, that 
remedial secession should, therefore, be part of customary international 
law.45 The declaration further states that:  
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government 
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.46 
                                                                                                                              
national boundaries. A secession right based on the notion that ethnic or minority groups are 
automatically entitled to their own territory would threaten to internationalize many domestic group 
conflicts and could create new conflicts. In contrast, a right of secession available only to oppressed 
groups when a majority of persons within a particular territory favors separation could provide a 
permanent political remedy to at least some groups without undermining international order or 
undemocratically ‘encapsulating’ ethnic majorities in newly independent states.”). 
42  Id. 
43  Simon, supra note 23, at 122 (“The so-called safeguard clause in the Declaration on Friendly 
Relations provides one legal argument for a remedial right of secession.”). 
44   G.A. Res. 26/25 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). 
45 Simon, supra note 23, at 122 (“The Declaration on Friendly Relations has been found to reflect 
customary international law…The argument is that although the Declaration on Friendly Relations 
does not explicitly grant a right to secession, it does infer such a right.”). 
46  G.A. Res. 26/25 , supra note 43 (italics added).  
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Some scholars have read this clause to suggest that the right of 
territorial integrity and political unity is contingent upon a sovereign’s 
compliance with the principles of equal rights and self-determination.47 
Therefore, if a state is not respecting these principles, a people are entitled 
to secede remedially. Others have challenged this reading of the 
declaration, asserting that the declaration was not drafted with such 
authorizations in mind, and arguing that such a reading would be 
inconsistent with the rest of the declaration and that states did not intend 
for that to be the effect.48 
At least one other scholar, meanwhile, views remedial secession as an 
appropriate extension of John Locke’s social contract theory.49 That if the 
sovereign government breaches the trust of its people in such an egregious 
way, the people, as Locke expressed, have a right to liberty from that 
government.50 It is worth noting that such a rationale has justified state 
                                                        
47  Vidmar, supra note 14, at 38 (“While the principle of territorial integrity limits the right of 
self-determination, it is precisely the elaboration of this principle in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law which gives rise to the remedial secession theory… An inverted reading of this 
provision would suggest that a state which does not possess ‘a government representing the whole 
people belonging to the territory without any distinction’ is not entitled to invoke the principle of 
territorial integrity when limiting the right of self-determination. Still, it is questionable whether 
remedial secession has enough support in legal doctrine and state practice to be considered an actual 
entitlement under international law.”); See also Simon, supra note 23, at 122 (“Documents, such as the 
1970 U.N. General Assembly Resolution entitled ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations’ (Declaration on Friendly Relations), indicate a willingness of the international 
community to extend the idea of peoples beyond the colonial context.”). 
48  Kohen, supra note 17, at 10 (“A very controversial issue debated at some length in this book 
is the scope of the so-called ‘safeguard clause’ embodied in the Friendly Relations Declaration and 
repeated in subsequent instruments. For some of the contributors…the interpretation of this 
clause leads to the legal acceptance of a ‘remedial secession’, at least as a measure of last 
resort…Like other authors in this book (e.g., Tancredi, Corten, and Christakis), the editor does not 
share this view which, according to him, is not in conformity with the rest of the Declaration’s chapter 
on self-determination. The ‘safeguard clause’ was originally drafted with situations such as South 
Africa and Rhodesia in mind, without any intention to extend recognition to any ‘secession’ rights to 
the majority of the South African and Zimbabwean peoples, as victims of racist regimes.”). 
49  Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 35 (1997) (“The 
recognition of a remedial right to secede can be seen as supplementing Locke’s theory of revolution 
and theories like it. Locke tends to focus on cases where the government perpetrates injustices against 
‘the people,’ not a particular group within the state, and seems to assume that the issue of revolution 
arises usually only when there has been a persistent pattern of abuses affecting large numbers of 
people throughout the state. This picture of legitimate revolution is conveniently simple: When the 
people suffer prolonged and serious injustices, the people will rise.”). 
50  Charlotte Mueller, Secession and self-determination - Remedial Right Only Theory 
scrutinised, 7 POLIS 283, 287-88 (2012). Mueller highlights, however, that unlike John Locke’s social 
contract theory, the remedial right of secession pertains to situations concerning a sub-state region, 
rather than the nation in its entirety. Although she does not address this issue, the notion that remedial 
secession concerns a sub-state region raises issues about how broadly international law should define 
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formation in other contexts, including the United States.51 Further still, 
others justify remedial secession under moral philosophy: that if sovereign 
governments persistently violate peoples’ most basic human rights and the 
only alternative to suffering this is secession, then secession becomes a 
morally permissible, if not the only, recourse.52 
However, the strongest legal argument in favor of integrating remedial 
secession into the right of self-determination is that remedial secession is 
the logical and natural evolution to the well-established and jus cogens 
right of colonial self-determination. If international law deemed —as it 
did—that colonial peoples, undeserving of foreign subjugation, had an 
indisputable right to independence and sovereign territory of their own, 
why would that same rationale not apply in the post-colonial context to 
peoples who are oppressed by their own governments? Judge Cançado 
Trindade of the ICJ, in his separate opinion in the Kosovo case, said as 
much:  
Human nature being what it is, systematic oppression has again 
occurred, in distinct contexts; hence the recurring need, and right, of 
people to be freed from it. The principle of self-determination has 
survived decolonization, only to face nowadays new and violent 
manifestations of systematic oppression of peoples. International 
administration of territory has thus emerged in UN practice (in 
distinct contexts under the UN Charter, as, for example, in East 
Timor and in Kosovo). It is immaterial whether, in the framework 
of these new experiments, self-determination is given the 
qualification of ‘remedial’ or another qualification. The fact remains 
that people cannot be targeted for atrocities, cannot live under 
                                                                                                                              
‘people.’ It is well-established that peoples generally have a right to self-determination under 
international law. However, it is more ambiguous as to whether, for example, the Kurds in Iraq would 
constitute a ‘people’ in this context. 
51  The Declaration of Independence and Natural Rights, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
FOUNDATION (2001), https://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html 
(“Most scholars today believe that Jefferson derived the most famous ideas in the Declaration of 
Independence from the writings of English philosopher John Locke. Locke wrote his Second Treatise 
of Government in 1689 at the time of England's Glorious Revolution, which overthrew the rule of 
James II . . . Locke concluded, if a government persecutes its people with ‘a long train of abuses’ over 
an extended period, the people have the right to resist that government, alter or abolish it, and create a 
new political system.”).  
52  Seshagiri, supra note 20, at 568-69 (2010) (“Broadly stated, the theory is as follows: 
‘Individuals are morally justified in defending themselves against violations of their most basic human 
rights. When the only alternative to continuing to suffer these injustices is secession, the right of the 
victims to defend themselves voids the state’s claim to the territory and this makes it morally 
permissible for them to join together to secede.’”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol19/iss2/4
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systematic oppression. The principle of self-determination applies 
in new situations of systematic oppression, subjugation and 
tyranny.53 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in their case on Quebec secession, 
demonstrated that they were similarly open to equating the self-
determination rights of colonial peoples to that of non-colonial peoples 
who are oppressed. As the opinion states, “a right to secession only arises 
under the principle of self-determination of people at international law 
where ‘a people’ is governed as part of a colonial empire; where ‘a people’ 
is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation; and possibly 
where ‘a people’ is denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-
determination within the state of which it forms a part.”54 
During the 2010 ICJ Kosovo case, some voiced sentiments similar to 
those expressed by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Netherlands, for 
example, stated:  
There has been a serious breach of the obligation to respect and 
promote the right to self-determination . . . It is, therefore, the 
opinion of the Kingdom of the Netherlands that the answer to the 
question should be that the proclamation of the independence of 
Kosovo on 17 February 2008 is in accordance with international 
law or, alternatively, that international law neither authorizes nor 
prohibits the proclamation.55  
Germany also supported Kosovo’s right to self-determination, stating 
that “[t]he facts preceding the Kosovo Declaration of Independence . . . 
reveal a clear case of prolonged and severe repression and denial of all 
internal self-determination.”56 
                                                        
53  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion, at 593 (July 22) (separate 
opinion by Trindade, J.). 
54  Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R 217, 222  (italics added). This case was a 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the legality of a unilateral secession from Canada 
by Quebec. The Court considered the Constitution of Canada, but also the application of international 
law and Quebec’s right to unilaterally secede in accordance with that.  On the constitutional inquiry, 
the Court held that a constitutional amendment would be required to allow Quebec to secede. On the 
question of international law, which is the more relevant here, the Court held that Quebec could not 
unilaterally secede, but did call for secession negotiations following a referendum. Id. 
55  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion, at 12-13 (Written 
Statement of the Kingdom of the Netherlands). 
56  Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion, at 35 (Written Statement 
of Germany). See generally Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence Advisory Opinion 
(Written Proceedings) (Reactions from other member states were varied. Some states argued that the 
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That colonial peoples have the right under international law to establish 
their own sovereign territories is a compelling and logically consistent 
reason as to why oppressed peoples deserve the same. Indeed, if colonial 
self-determination is a jus cogens right, it follows perhaps that it should be 
a jus cogens right for non-colonial oppressed peoples as well. However, 
while there should be a legal right to remedial secession in international 
law on the basis of the precedent rights provided to colonial peoples, even 
this conception of secessionist rights may be too narrow. This becomes 
evident when the remedial secessionist model is applied to the Kurdish 
situation in Iraq. 
IV. APPLYING THE REMEDIAL SECESSION MODEL TO THE KURDS IN IRAQ 
A. The Current Status of the Iraqi Kurds 
Proponents of remedial secession have often argued that a legal right of 
secession should exist as a last resort for a people who are being presently 
oppressed.57 The secessionist movement undertaken by the Kurds in Iraq, 
however, complicates this rather narrow view. This is because it is not 
evident that the Kurds are currently oppressed to a sufficient degree 
despite arguably still deserving a sovereign state of their own. Iraqi Kurds 
can certainly argue that they are being oppressed by the federal 
government of Iraq, but their claims are weaker when compared to, for 
example, the mass atrocities in Kosovo. As will be explained here, the 
Kurds’ argument is essentially twofold: that the federal government has 
persistently disregarded their constitutional rights, and that it has failed to 
provide security to the Kurdistan region.  
In 2005, after the death of Saddam Hussein and the fall of his Ba’athist 
regime, Iraq adopted a new constitution. Article 140 of the constitution 
calls for “a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to 
determine the will of their citizens[], by a date not to exceed the 31st of 
December 2007.”58 Kirkuk is an Iraqi city, control of which has long been 
disputed by the Kurds and the federal government. Not only are oil fields 
                                                                                                                              
Kosovo’s declaration of independence was not prohibited by international law, but explicitly or 
implicitly declined to assert that Kosovo had the right to self-determination or secession. Other states 
asserted that Kosovo’s declaration was contrary to international law for it violated Serbia’s territorial 
integrity or because the right of self-determination applies only to colonies, of which Kosovo never 
was). 
57  Vidmar, supra note 14, at 37. 
58  CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ Oct. 15, 2005, art. 140. 
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abundant in Kirkuk, but many Kurds regard the land as a symbol of their 
people to a degree that is similar to the way in which Muslims, Christians, 
and Jews revere Jerusalem.59 Despite the economic and cultural 
significance of the city and the constitutional promise to hold a 
referendum by the end of 2007, no such referendum has ever occurred. In 
2010, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki went as far as to say that 
Article 140 could not be implemented.60 Even more, although the Kurds 
exercise de facto control over Kirkuk, the federal government recently 
deployed its military forces and took the city.61 In 2017, Masoud Barzani, 
who was president of the Iraqi Kurdistan Region from 2005 to 2017, cited 
the failure to implement Article 140 as one reason for independence.62 
Another article of the constitution, 112, is also heavily contested. 
Article 112 states that the “federal government, with the producing 
governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the management 
                                                        
59  The Other Jerusalem, THE ECONOMIST (April 4, 2007), https://www.economist.com/middle-
east-and-africa/2007/04/04/the-other-jerusalem (“…for Kirkuk’s Kurds and their brethren in the 
autonomous Kurdish region to the north, [Kirkuk] is about far more than just oil. Kirkuk is a symbol, 
they say, of everything Kurdish: their people, their land, their history. They say they can be reconciled 
with their Arab compatriots, both Sunni and Shia, only if Saddam Hussein's ‘Arabisation’ campaign—
the settlement of tens of thousands of Arabs in Kirkuk during his three decades in power—is 
reversed.”). 
60  Scott A. Anderson, The constitutional context for Iraq’s latest crisis, THE BROOKINGS INST. 
(Nov. 7, 2017) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/11/07/the-constitutional-context-for-
iraqs-latest-crisis/ (“By 2010, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was publicly suggesting that 
Article 140 is ‘drafted in such a way that it cannot be implemented,’ necessitating a constitutional 
amendment . . . But for Iraqi Kurds—who widely believed that the results of the referendum would 
support making the disputed territories part of the Kurdistan Region—this apparent willingness to 
ignore Article 140 only cast further doubt over the legitimacy of the Iraqi government’s own claims of 
constitutional authority.”). 
61  Id. (“An explicit response to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)’s recent decision to 
hold a referendum on independence, the offensive quickly recaptured the contested city of Kirkuk, 
which—like much of the disputed territories—had been under the KRG’s de facto control for several 
years. This in turn severed the KRG’s access to the significant oil wealth around Kirkuk, dealing a 
serious blow to any hopes of secession.”). See also Alia Chughtai, Territory lost by Kurds in Iraq, AL 
JAZEERA (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/10/territory-lost-kurds-
iraq-171031133441429.html (“Kurds in northern Iraq voted in a non-binding secession referendum on 
September 25. Since then, they have lost 40 percent of the area they had taken in the fight against 
ISIL, as Iraqi forces have moved in.”). 
62  Masoud Barzani, The time has come for Iraq to make its choice on independence, WASH. 
POST (June 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/06/28/the-
time-has-come-for-iraqi-kurdistan-to-make-its-choice-on-
independence/?fbclid=IwAR0vkmFbXqV5YPiGqP4CG7U4RauJ61LFeuD3sfWXEI-
wauOTdyIKXeLWt_g&noredirect=on&utm_term=.72fe15a91feb (“Fourteen years later, Baghdad has 
failed to implement key provisions of that constitution, and we have good reason to believe that it 
never will. This failure of the political system is also responsible for the drastic deterioration of 
relations between Sunnis and Shiites that led to the rise of the Islamic State, with disastrous 
consequences for all Iraqis, including the Kurds.”). 
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of oil and gas extracted from present fields . . . .”63 Pursuant to the 
language of Article 112, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has 
argued that the federal government can only manage the oil fields in 
operation at the time of the constitution’s adoption. Therefore, it is 
unconstitutional for the Iraqi government to interfere with KRG’s new oil 
and gas projects.64 
Alongside these constitutional arguments is the claim that the Iraqi 
government’s failure or unwillingness to adequately protect the Kurdistan 
region is grounds for independence. As Barzani further wrote, “When the 
Islamic State attacked Kurdistan in 2014…the Iraqi government refused to 
give Kurdistan its constitutionally mandated share of the federal budget or 
to provide our soldiers (known as the peshmerga) with weapons.”65 In the 
wake of the Islamic State’s invasion, Iraqi security forces also abandoned 
previously disputed areas, leaving Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers to 
undertake much of the fighting.66 As Barzani stated in 2017, the 
independence of Kurdistan is necessary to prevent the “deterioration of the 
security of the whole region.”67 
Thus, the KRG’s frustration toward the Iraqi government is based upon 
disputed territory, disputed oil and gas contracts, and claims that Iraq has 
not adequately protected the region from invading forces. The remedial 
secession model calls for an examination as to whether a people are being 
systematically oppressed by their government. The squabbles between the 
Kurdistan Regional Government and the Iraqi federal government may 
not, therefore, rise to the level of oppression required by the current 
conception of remedial secession. As such, according to the current 
conception of remedial secession, Iraqi Kurds may not be lawfully entitled 
to secede. 
This note, however, proposes that the current scope of remedial 
secession may be too narrow. The remedial secession model largely 
                                                        
63  CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ, supra note 58 (emphasis added). 
64  Anderson, supra note 60. Conversely to the position taken by the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, the Iraqi federal government has maintained that, pursuant to Article 112, the 
management of oil and gas falls under the responsibility of the federal government. Further increasing 
the tension is the fact that the Kurdistan Regional Government has pursued contracts for oil and gas in 
these disputed areas. Id. 
65  Barzani, supra note 62. 
66  Iraq Kurdistan independence referendum planned, BBC (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28103124.  
67  Masoud Barzani, Why It’s Time for Kurdish Independence, FOREIGN POLICY (June 15, 
2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/15/masoud-barzani-why-its-time-for-kurdish-independence/. 
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focuses upon current conditions. Instead, remedial secession should 
perhaps take into consideration historical patterns of systematic 
oppression, as well as the propensity for future oppression. When such an 
analysis is applied to the Kurds in Iraq, their claim for independence 
becomes far more compelling. 
B. A Pattern of Oppression 
The Kurds are not a post-colonial people seeking independence in the 
same fashion as, for example, India seeking independence from the United 
Kingdom after World War II. The Kurds have, however, suffered from 
long periods of colonization.68 They lived under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire until the empire’s dissolution after the Great War.69 During 
President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points address, in which he 
outlined principles for peace, he stated that the nationalities formerly 
under Ottoman rule—which included the Kurds—should be given the 
opportunity for autonomous development.70 The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, 
which followed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire after the war, also 
provided for a Kurdish state.71 Hopes for Kurdish post-colonial 
independence, however, were dashed by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, 
which overrode the failed Treaty of Sèvres and did not include the creation 
of a Kurdish state.72 
                                                        
68  Thomas Hale, A Short History of the Kurds, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), 
https://www.ft.com/content/879661d7-d33e-3d58-85f3-862d4074121a. 
69  Id. 
70  President Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 2018) (transcript available at OUR 
DOCUMENTS, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=62&page=transcript) (“The 
Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other 
nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an 
absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development…”). See also Rick Noack, The long, 
winding history of American dealings with Iraq’s Kurds, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/10/17/the-long-winding-history-of-
american-dealings-with-iraqs-kurds-2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.596afe57e92c (“Iraq itself is the 
product of three old Ottoman vilayets, or provinces, that were subsequently claimed by British 
mandate after the end of World War I and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. At the time, President 
Woodrow Wilson supported the idea of autonomy for non-Turks in the Ottoman Empire. But the 
Kurds were to be disappointed: denied their own self-determination, their lands were split among Iran, 
Turkey and Iraq.”). 
71  Who are the Kurds, BBC (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
29702440?fbclid=IwAR3yb_iKLyFhevcwfGwtmxl89VueoL1nr1g_aABL95tMuOLU5K1ilfzS7xk. 
72  Id. 
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The Kurds then came under the control of another colonial state as the 
Kingdom of Iraq under British Administration was formed in 1922.73 
While Iraq oversaw local governance, Britain retained control over foreign 
and military affairs.74 Once again, the Kurds found themselves subjected 
to another power’s rule. During this time, the Kurds continued to seek 
autonomy, undertaking several revolts against their rulers.75 After Britain 
relinquished control, the Kingdom of Iraq became a sovereign country in 
1932.76 By the 1970s, Saddam Hussein had risen to power. It was during 
this time that he began to ‘Arabize’ Kurdish territory in northern Iraq, 
diluting the ethnic composition of the territories by importing large Arab 
communities and forcing out many Kurds. By the end of the decade, Iraq 
had forcibly resettled many thousands of Kurds.77  
This, however, was only the beginning. During the 1980s, Saddam 
Hussein had become impatient with the Kurdish rebellions and decided the 
best way to deal with the issue was to “stamp out Kurdish life.”78 Between 
1987 and 1988, in what was known as the Anfal Campaign, Iraqi forces 
destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages and killed nearly 100,000 Kurds, 
many of whom were unarmed and who were bussed to remote areas where 
they were gunned down in mass executions.79 Hussein also ordered the use 
of chemical weapons upon the Kurdish villages. One attack, on the 
Kurdish town of Halabja, was particularly horrific: 
                                                        
73  See PHEBE MARR, THE MODERN HISTORY OF IRAQ 26 (2012) (“The mandate awarded to 
Britain by the League of Nations had specified that Iraq should be prepared for self-government under 
British tutelage but left the means and mode to the mandatory power. The British decided to express 
the mandatory relationship by a treaty, deemed the most imaginative way to neutralize Iraqi 
opposition…in October 1922 the Council of Ministers ratified the treaty. The treaty was the backbone 
of Britain’s indirect rule.”). 
74  British Relations with Iraq, BBC (Feb. 10, 2002), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/recent/iraq/britain_iraq_03.shtml. 
75  Iraqi Kurdistan profile - timeline, BBC (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-15467672. 
76  John E. Woods et al., Iraq, Encyclopedia Britannica (Jan. 29, 2020), 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Iraq/The-revolution-of-1968. 
77  SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 175 
(2002) (“Hussein promptly ordered the 4,000 square miles of Kurdish territory in northern Iraq 
Arabized. He diluted mixed-race districts by importing large Arab communities and required that 
Kurds leave any areas he deemed strategically valuable. Beginning in 1975 and continuing 
intermittently through the late 1970s, the Iraqis established a 6–12-mile-wide ‘prohibited zone’ along 
their border with Iran. Iraqi forces destroyed every village that fell inside the zone and relocated 
Kurdish inhabitants to the mujamma’at, large army-controlled collective settlements along the main 
highways in the interior. Tens of thousands of Kurds were deported to southern Iraq.”). 
78  Id. at 171. 
79  Id. at 172.  
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Halabja quickly became known as the Kurdish Hiroshima. In three 
days of attacks, victims were exposed to mustard gas, which burns, 
mutates DNA, and causes malformations and cancer; and the nerve 
gases sarin and tabun, which can kill, paralyze, or cause immediate 
and lasting neuropsychiatric damage. Doctors suspect that the 
dreaded VX gas and the biological agent aflatoxin were also 
employed. Some 5,000 Kurds were killed immediately. Thousands 
more were injured.80 
As bad as this attack was, it was only one of at least forty of such 
chemical assaults.81 By the end of the campaign, Iraqi forces had killed as 
many as 182,000 Kurds.82 Human Rights Watch eventually declared that 
Iraq had committed genocide upon the Iraqi Kurds.83 Despite this, the 
Kurds staged another independence rebellion in the 1990s, which was yet 
again crushed.84 
This is merely a brief overview of the Kurds’ treatment in Iraq. In the 
space of a century, the Kurds have lived under the rule of both colonizers 
and authoritarian regimes. They have been promised and then denied 
independence. They have made nearly countless attempts at gaining 
autonomy, all of which have failed.85 They have suffered a genocide. Their 
experience is illustrative of the notion that, perhaps, the scope and 
lawfulness of remedial secession should not only factor into consideration 
present conditions but also rest upon remedying systematic, historical 
abuse. Those who wish to evaluate the merits of the Kurds’ right to secede 
                                                        
80  Id. at 189. 
81  Id. 
82  See Dave Johns, The Crimes of Saddam Hussein, PBS (Jan. 24, 2006), 
https://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/events_anfal.html.  
83  Genocide in Iraq, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2008), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ (“[This report] concludes that…the Iraqi regime 
committed the crime of genocide…While it is impossible to understand the Anfal campaign without 
reference to the final phase of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Anfal was not merely a function of that 
war. Rather, the winding-up of the conflict on Iraq's terms was the immediate historical circumstance 
that gave Baghdad the opportunity to bring to a climax its longstanding efforts to bring the Kurds to 
heel. For the Iraqi regime's anti-Kurdish drive dated back some fifteen years or more, well before the 
outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq). See also POWER, supra note 74, at 244 (“For the first 
time in its history, Human Rights Watch found that a country had committed genocide. Often a large 
number of victims is required to help show an intent to destroy a group. But in the Iraqi case the 
confiscated government records explicitly recorded Iraqi aims to wipe out rural Kurdish life.”). 
84   A Chronology of U.S.-Kurdish History, PBS, 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/kurds/cron.html. 
85  Iraqi Kurdistan profile - timeline, BBC (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-15467672. 
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should look beyond the nature of the Kurds’ relationship with the current 
Iraqi federal government and instead determine whether the Kurds, due to 
generational oppression, are a people deserving of and in need of a secure, 
sovereign territory of their own.  
Directly related to this is the notion that peoples, such as the Kurds, 
should have the right to secede so that the genocide, subjugation, and 
oppression of the past are not inflicted in the future. History has a 
tendency to repeat itself. As the right of remedial secession should account 
for past abuse, so it should also look ahead. 
C. The Likelihood of Future Oppression 
The Iraqi federal government’s response to the 2017 Kurdish 
referendum indicates potential warning signs for the future. After the vote, 
then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi called for the cancellation of the 
referendum.86 The government subsequently called the referendum 
illegal,87 and Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court ruled the vote unconstitutional 
and its results void.88 Meanwhile, the federal government imposed 
retaliatory sanctions, banned international flights to the Kurdistan 
Region,89 and forcibly seized the city of Kirkuk and other territories that 
the Kurds had held since the Islamic State’s invasion.90 The federal 
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https://www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/iraqi-pm-calls-on-kurdistan-to-cancel-referendum-start-
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88  Ahmed Rasheed and Raya Jalabi, Iraqi court rules Kurdish independence vote 
unconstitutional, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-
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Court’s ruling that the referendum was unconstitutional and that the Kurdistan Regional Government 
should cancel the referendum's results was final. The opinion was final and is not subject to appeal. Id. 
See also Iraq Supreme Court rules Kurdish referendum unconstitutional, BBC (Nov. 20, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42053283 (“The Iraqi Supreme Court has ruled that a 
referendum on Kurdish independence was unconstitutional…The head of Iraq's autonomous Kurdistan 
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90  Maher Chmaytelli and Mustafa Mahmoud, Iraqi forces seize oil city Kirkuk from Kurds in 
bold advance, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-
kirkuk/iraqi-forces-seize-oil-city-kirkuk-from-kurds-in-bold-advance-idUSKBN1CK0XL (“Iraqi 
government forces captured the major Kurdish-held oil city of Kirkuk on Monday, responding to a 
Kurdish referendum on independence with a bold lightning strike that transforms the balance of power 
in the country.”). 
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government also rejected the Kurds’ offer to freeze the referendum 
results.91 
Iraq’s retributive actions indicate that the Kurds remain vulnerable to 
oppression, violence, and discriminatory treatment in the future; that the 
pattern of persecution the Kurds have faced for more than a century may 
continue. Just as the historical record should be included in the remedial 
secession calculus, so perhaps should the propensity for future oppression. 
Unfortunately, it is likely that the international community, already 
skeptical of remedial secession, would be reluctant to broaden its scope. 
CONCLUSION 
While self-determination—the right of a people to determine their own 
political future—is universally acknowledged under international law, the 
right to secede is ill-defined and inconsistently applied. This lack of clarity 
dangerously restricts the ability of stateless peoples to free themselves 
from oppressive regimes. For this reason, international law should 
recognize the right of remedial secession. As an expression of self-
determination, it should be lawful for oppressed peoples to remedy their 
situation through secession, and the international community should 
regard those new states as legitimate. This is consistent with and supported 
by the jus cogens right of independence widely ascribed to post-colonial 
peoples.  
Moreover, the right of remedial secession should reflect not only an 
evaluation of present conditions but the broader experience of a people. 
This includes evaluations as to the nature of past oppression and the 
likelihood that such oppression may again occur in the future. Looking 
both to the past and the future is consistent with the principles that 
underlie remedial secession and may provide fairer outcomes for stateless 
peoples, such as the Kurds, who deserve—and who have long dreamed 
of—freedom. 
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